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Reversing three decades of patenting policy, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimouslyruled on June 13, 2013, that naturally occurring DNAwas not patent eligible. Before
this decision, over twenty per cent of human geneswere subject to patents—a factwhich had
widely gone unnoticed until the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Public
Patent Foundation (PPF) filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court in May 2009. They
suednot only theU.S. Patent andTrademarkOffice (USPTO), but also thebiotech company
Myriad Genetics, whose patents on genes associated with hereditary breast and ovarian
cancer, BRCA1 and BRCA2, were among the few to be enforced. This trial generated a
heated public debate over the patentability of human genes. It emerged from this debate
that people’s intuitions about human genes conflict with the practice of patenting them.
Gene patents were viewed as a threat to the progress of science, the accessibility of health
care, our ownership of our own bodies, and human dignity itself. But one conception in
particular came to dominate the legal and political debate: the view that the human genome
forms part of the common heritage of mankind.1 Many divergent intuitions are rallied
under this heading, but this common heritage idea (CHI) has become the master argument
in attempts to give voice to the sentiment which James Watson, co-discoverer of DNA,
expressed in one of 49 amicus curiae briefs: “Life’s instructions ought not be controlled by
legal monopolies created at the whim of Congress or the courts.”2
1 B. M. Knoppers writes: “At the international level, there is increasing recognition and confirmation that
. . . the human genome is the common heritage of humanity” (Bartha Maria Knoppers, “Biobanking:
International Norms,” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 33.1 (2005), 7-14 at p. 11). Also, both
the Human Genome Organization and the UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights designate the human genome as a part of the “common heritage of mankind.” See
The Human Genome Organization, “Statement on the Principled Conduct of Genetics Research,” Eubios
Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 6.3 (1996); Noelle Lenoir, “Universal Declaration on the
Human Genome and Human Rights: The First Legal and Ethical Framework at the Global Level,”
Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30 (1999).
2 JamesWatson, “Brief amicus curiae of United States in support of neither party,”Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013).
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Yet in this same brief, Watson went on to draw attention to the fact that DNA possesses
a peculiar double nature. It is, he says, only the
. . . myopic viewpoint [which] thinks of a human gene as merely another chemical
compound, composed of various bases and sugars. But history and science teach us
otherwise. A human gene, which is a product of nature, is useful because it conveys
vital information.3
This passage brings out that DNA is both an analog chemical compound and a carrier of
digitally encoded information. Moreover, it highlights that while it is under the first aspect
that DNA is a product of nature, which is a criterion for exclusion from patentability, it is
under a different aspect, namely as a carrier of information, that it is “useful”—which
is a criterion for patentability. The tension between these countervailing descriptions
raises the question whether, by distinguishing rigorously between these two aspects, the
perceived conflict between the patent system and some of our intuitions about the genome
can be dissolved. After a brief sketch of the patent regime’s main objectives and their
implementation and application to biotechnology, this paper explores the lines of reasoning
that lead to the CHI. It aims to (i) reevaluate those lines of reasoning in the light of DNA’s
double nature, (ii) articulate and motivate what emerges as the most viable version of
the CHI, and (iii) assess the extent to which this version conflicts with current patenting
practices.
The conclusion put forward in this paper is that in the light of DNA’s double nature,
the human genome is best thought of as a repository of information: a record of biological
history and a source of future innovation that is best compared to the cultural and natural
heritage. And while distinguishing the physical from the informational aspect of DNA goes
some way towards dissolving the perceived conflict with patenting practices, it also brings
out a sense in which the Supreme Court’s ruling exploits precisely this double nature to pay
but lip service toWatson’s injunction to release “Life’s instructions.”
I
On the side of the patent system, its perceived conflict with people’s intuitions about
the human genome might derive either from its core objectives, from those objectives’
implementation in the current patent regime, or from the application of patent law to
a particular field or case. We can identify what are uncontroversially core objectives of
the patent system by taking as our guide theWorld Trade Organization’s legally binding
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), to which
the United States have subscribed along with 157 otherWTOmembers. In this agreement’s
formulation, the patent system’s objectives are to
3 Ibid., emphasis mine.
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. . . contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare,
and to a balance of rights and obligations.4
In the U.S., these objectives are implemented by giving inventors the possibility of applying
for a patent on inventions which are demonstrably novel, non-obvious and useful.5 The
legal title of a patent bestows the right (for twenty years) to prevent others frommaking,
using, selling, offering for sale, or importing an invention without the inventor’s consent.
In return, the applicant must disclose all relevant information on the invention in the
patent application. Patents are thus a trade-o between the protection and the disclosure of
information: they incentivise discovery, investment and commercialisation by making it
potentially lucrative to invest in the development of new products or processes, but they
constitute an important source of technical information for the competition.
It is with the coming to maturity of biochemistry in the 1970s that patent law began
to be applied to genetic material. While laws of nature, natural phenomena and naturally
occurring species are excluded from patentability, the USPTO began issuing patents on
DNA, a full legal justification for which was advanced only in the “Utility Examination
Guidelines” of 2001.6 According to these guidelines, DNA within bodies is not patent-
eligible, but two other forms of genetic material are:
(1) isolated genomic DNA (gDNA): DNA fragments of various sizes that have been
removed from the surrounding genome; and
(2) complementary DNA (cDNA):DNAthat has been synthesised fromaDNA-derived
messenger RNA (mRNA) template for protein-synthesis.
The patentability of these two forms of DNAwas justified primarily by two long-standing
judicial doctrines. The first goes back to the dicta (assertions by judges that are neither
essential to decisions nor legally binding but potentially influential) of Judge LearnedHand
inParke-Davis v. H. K.Mulford, a 1911 casewhich concerned a patent on adrenalin that had
been produced in concentrated form. Hand declared that adrenalin, having been extracted,
4 World Trade Organization, “TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C”, The Legal
Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: CUP, 1999),
319–351 at Art. 7.
5 In Europe, the legal situation is more intricate: while a supranational body of “soft law” was passed with
the signing of the European Patent Convention by 38 states, patents still need to be applied for individually
in every state. For this reason, this paper focuses on U.S. patent law, and its wider relevance might be seen
to lie in examining what the implications would be of having a U.S.-style gene patenting regime enacted
worldwide.
6 US Patent and Trademark Office, “Utility Examination Guidelines”, Federal Register 66.4 (Jan. 2001),
1092–1099.
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purified, and thus made useful, became “a new thing commercially and therapeutically,”
and that this constituted a “good ground for a patent.”7 The second doctrine originated
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1980 inDiamond v. Chakrabarty, a landmark case in
which a genetically modified bacterium was declared patentable. The Court argued that
products of nature are eligible for patents if they display “markedly different characteristics
from any found in nature.”8 It is this application of patent law which historically marks the
explosion of gene patents.
II
Turning to the other side of the perceived conflict, people’s intuitions about the human
genome, their first articulation in terms of the CHI goes back to the opening article of the
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, which
also constitutes the first global legal and ethical framework attempting to set standards
for activities in this area.9 “The human genome,” this 1997 declaration reads, “underlies
the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of
their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity.”10
However, this document provides little guidance on how the concept of the common
heritage of mankind is to be understood. In The Concept of the Common Heritage of
Mankind in International Law, Kemal Baslar locates “the only fully-fledged development
of the concept”11 in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, which
declared the seabed and ocean floor to be the “common heritage of mankind”12 and vested
“[a]ll rights in the resources” of that area in “mankind as a whole.”13 It called for all activities
in the deep sea to be carried out “for the benefit of mankind as a whole . . . taking into
particular consideration the interests and needs of developing States and of peoples who
have not attained full independence or other self-governing status.”14 Partly for historical
reasons, this instantiation of the CHI was concerned with equity.15 It turned the deep
7 Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co. 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
8 Diamond v. Chakrabarty 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
9 See Noelle Lenoir, “Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights: The First Legal
and Ethical Framework at the Global Level,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 30 (1999), 537-587.
10 UNESCO, “Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights,” Records of the General
Conference (Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1998), 41-46 at Art.
1.
11 Kemal Baslar,The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law (TheHague, Boston
and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), p. 206.
12 United Nations, “Convention on the Law of the Sea,” International Legal Materials, Treaties and
Agreements 21 (1982), 1261-1354 at Art. 136.
13 Ibid., Art. 137, §2.
14 Ibid., Art. 162, §2.
15 The Convention on the Law of the Sea was partly a response to the concern of less-industrialised nations
that power imbalances would unjustly favour resource exploitation by more-industrialised nations.
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sea from a res nullius, a resource or territory belonging to nobody, into a res communis, a
resource or territory belonging to everybody.
Some have thought that this conception of the common heritage can and should be
extended to include the human genome. Emmanuel Agius writes: “If there is an obvious
component of the commonheritage ofmankind, indeed,more obvious than the resources of
the sea-bed itself, it is the human genetic system.”16TheCHI asmodelled on theConvention
on the Law of the Sea, which we might call the Shared Property Heritage Idea (SPHI),
might be thought to inherit from its precedent a concern for equity, on the rationale that if
a resource belongs to everybody, benefits derived from its exploitation should be shared
equitably, even if these benefits are the fruit of only a few people’s labour. Applied to
the genome, the SPHI would encourage the creation of a common property interest in a
resource residing in all human cells, and provide an impetus to the equitable distribution
of benefits deriving from the human genome’s exploitation, making it attractive to those
concerned about biopiracy, i.e. the exploitative commercialisation of products based on
biological resources.
Others have been more reluctant to take up the UNESCO’s suggestion. David Resnik
has even argued that applying the CHI to the genome is incoherent.17 If we take the idea
seriously, Resnik maintains, we should be able to spell out exactly what falls under it. Yet
in the face of genetic variations between individuals, even this first step is problematical.
Indeed, the most common type of genetic variation, a difference in a single nucleotide
(called a single nucleotide polymorphism, or SNP), occurs on average once in every three-
hundred nucleotides. With 3 billion base pairs, one would expect roughly 10 million such
SNPs in any one human genome. Resnik points out that this makes it difficult to identify a
single thing or set of things constituting the human genome.18 Moreover, Resnik’s second
argument runs, to view the human genome as part of the common heritage is to view us as
its heirs. But since we share around 98.5 per cent of our genes with chimpanzees and sizeable
portions of it with other species, Resnik argues that no individual or set of individuals can
legitimately lay claim to that heritage without, by the same logic, conceding a similar claim
to other species, a conclusion Resnik treats as a reductio. Finally, Resnik contends that the
persons who bequeathed that heritage to us cannot be identified, and neither can their
intention to so bequeath it be established.19 For these reasons, Resnik concludes that the
CHI fails to be applicable to the human genome.
16 Emmanuel Agius, “Germ-line Cells —Our Responsibilities for Future Generations,”Our Responsibilities
Towards Future Generations, eds. S. Busuttil et al. (Valletta, Malta: Foundation for International Studies,
1990), 133-143 at p. 140.
17 David Resnik, “The Human Genome: Common Resource but not CommonHeritage,” Frontis 5 (2005),
197-210.
18 Ibid., p. 200.
19 Ibid., p. 201.
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Fleshing out the CHI by relating it to the Convention on the Law of the Sea and to the
double nature of DNA can help us answer Resnik’s criticism. His first point boils down
to a recognition of the fact that “the human genome” is a statistical concept, for which
no single, natural object provides a referent. In this respect, it is no different from other
statistical concepts such as “the average citizen.” The scientific community does justice to
this fact by working continuously on the assembly of a “reference genome,” a project which,
since 2007, has been in the hands of the Genome Reference Consortium (GRC).20 By
determining the relative frequencies of gene variants in homo sapiens, a reference sequence
consisting of the “default” variants is constructed and accompanied by the most frequent
non-default variants to reflect actual genomic diversity.21 While it might well be incoherent
to speak of a common property interest in “the human genome” in the sense of such an
abstract reference genome, it would make sense to speak of a common property interest in
the human genome understood as a collection of individual genomes: the set of all actually
occurring sequence variants. To understand the expression “the human genome” in this
way is not to take it figuratively or symbolically, but merely to spell out what, if anything,
falls under the term if it is taken to refer to some physical entity.
Resnik’s second objection starts with the observation that only around 1.5 per cent of
our DNA is specific to humans, and ends with the conclusion that we cannot coherently
claim the entire genome as our heritage without granting other species property rights in
proportion to their share in that genome. But this argument rests on the assumption that the
CHI involves the ascription of common property rights to a group—such as a species—on
the basis of that resource’s being common to all and only members of that group. Drawing
out the implications of such an assumption would lead us to designate the 1.5 per cent of
DNA common to all and only humans as the common heritage of humans, and the 26
per cent of DNA shared by a set of species including humans and yeast as the common
heritage of that set of species. There are many reasons to doubt that this is a conclusion we
would want to endorse; the essential role played by a gene’s environment (which includes
the other genes in the sequence it is part of) in determining a gene’s eventual effects is one
of them, because it makes it problematic to speak of the 1.5 per cent of genes specific to
humans as being meaningfully related to humans outside the context of the other 98.5 per
cent. But even supposing that only what is the prerogative of a group can form a part of
that group’s common heritage—the natural resources which have already been declared
constitutive of that heritage would, by parity of reasoning, equally fall prey to Resnik’s
objection: besides the deep sea, the moon and outer space have also been associated with the
CHI, and these are no more the prerogative of the human species than is the basic genetic
20 See http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/genome/assembly/grc/human/.
21 Editorial, “E Pluribus Unum,”Nature Methods 7.5 (2010), 331 at p. 331.
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organisation of life on earth. However, no such notions of exclusive commonality underlie
hitherto existing applications of the CHI. If past instantiations of the concept are any guide
in the matter, the CHI is concerned with the distribution of benefits deriving from certain
natural resources among humans. It is therefore logically independent from the degree of
our genetic proximity to other creatures.
With Resnik’s third objection, which consists in the claim that we can establish neither
from whom we inherit the genome nor whether it was intended to be so inherited, the
ahistorical, acontextual character of what is in effect a conceptual analysis of “heritage”
becomes apparent. If we grant any weight to the idea that the meaning of a doctrine
such as the CHI is determined in part by its past application, an approach that treats the
concept in complete isolation from its history andmerely looks at the logical structure of the
constituents of its name will appear inadequate. The precedents we have so far considered
leave no room for the demand that there should be an identifiable set of individuals who
intentionally bequeath us a natural resource: there is no identifiable set of people who
intended us to inherit the moon, or outer space, or the sea-bed. Resnik’s approach of asking
“Who inherits what from whom” might provide some guidance for an initial approach to
the issue, but we cannot do justice to such a politically and historically charged notion as the
CHI ifwe limit ourselves to a lexical understanding of the term.Resnik’s third objection thus
simply fails to address what is at issue here—if we take what is at issue to be the historically
mediated idea of mankind’s common heritage.
If, pace Resnik, we take the CHI’s application to the human genome to be coherent
in principle, the question becomes what it has to recommend it. One prominent line of
thought is what we may call the continuity argument: the genome is the common heritage
of mankind because genes secure some form of continuity from one generation to the next.
Agius, for instance, thinks that “progress in the science of genetics” has “contributed to the
awareness of the physical continuity ofmankind throughout time,” and that, as as result, we
have come to recognise that the “collective human gene pool knows no national or temporal
boundaries but is the biological heritage of the entire human species.”22 Eric Juengst, though
himself critical of this view, locates its appeal in the idea that the germ-line—the lineage
of cells that pass down genetic information to the next generation—forms a “thread that
connects all of us as one family, and through which we pass on that connection to our
children, as a unique and universal human legacy.”23
Yet the thought that physical continuity of the germ-line should ground its description
22 Emmanuel Agius, “Patenting Life: Our Responsibilities to Present and Future Generations,”Germ-Line
Intervention and Our Responsibilities Towards Future Generations, eds. E. Agius et al. (Dordrecht: Springer
1998), 67–84 at p. 76.
23 Eric T. Juengst, “Should we Treat the Human Germ-Line as a Global Human Resource?”, Germ-Line
Intervention and Our Responsibilities to Future Generations, eds. E. Agius et al. (Dordrecht: Springer, 1998),
85-102 at p. 86.
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as the common heritage of mankind quickly runs into difficulties. Germ-line cells form a
link between generations of organisms in that germ cells give rise to eggs or sperms, a subset
of which then constitute the first cells of the next generation of organisms. But as soon as we
ask how continuity is secured at the level of generations of cells, things get murkier. If it is
physical continuity we are looking for, it would need to be preserved in individualmolecules
persisting through each cell division, but since we are talking about living cells undergoing
metabolic processes that involve the constant building up and breaking down of cellular
components, this is a hopeless prospect. Rather, any useful concept of cellular identity will
have to be a functional one, and will thus involve the genetic information carried by the
cell. Hence, whatever continuity obtains between each generation will be continuity of
genetic information, and not of germ-line cells, which are only its physical substrate. And
as Juengst points out, even this continuity of information is limited: the term “germ-line”
picks out the lineage of dividing germ-cells which begins with an organism’s zygote stage
and ends in its gametes, but the next zygote, instead of resulting from a further division
within that lineage, combines the end-products of two lineages to found a new germ-line
whose genetic information differs substantially from that of its parent lineages. This is what
distinguishes sexual eucaryotes from asexual organisms forming continuous lineages of
mitotically dividing cells.24 The continuity argument is thus better suited to amoeba than
to human beings.
In fact, it is rather lack of continuity which advocates of the CHI should be concerned
with. No matter howmuch diachronic continuity the gene pool exhibits, we still face the
problem that synchronically, it differs from the deep sea or the moon in being a fragmented
and utterly discontinuous collection of resources residing in multiple cells within multiple
bodies, which, moreover, is partly internal and partly external to the bodies of the property
holders. This is a serious problem, because the idea that we should partake in common
property rights to something that is partly in our own and partly in other people’s bodies
conflicts with other beliefs about autonomy and self-ownership.25 If the heated debate over
gene patents has shown anything, it is that the belief that we should not own each other’s
bodies or their constituents is widely and strongly held. From this perspective, the CHI
merely displaces the problem: it takes away the property rights of a few patentees only to
grant them to humanity as a whole. Pilar Ossorio has concluded from this that the CHI is
ill-suited to set the terms for the debate, for it will hardly be satisfactory to one who holds
that nobody should own our genes to propose that everyone does.
At first sight, this might seem too swift. Talk of ownership gets its content by excluding
a set of people from freely disposing over a particular object. Owners are granted rights
24 Ibid., p. 88.
25 See Pilar N. Ossorio, “The Human Genome as CommonHeritage: Common Sense or Legal Nonsense?”
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 35 (2007), 425-439 at p. 429.
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against other people. But against whom do the owners of res communis have such rights?
After all, they are everyone. What differentiates objects which are collectively owned in
such a way from objects which nobody owns? The notion of exclusion is key here. Among
objects which nobody owns, one must distinguish between objects that are in principle
capable of being owned but are not (yet) owned (the res nullius of Roman Law), and
objects to which the concept of ownership is utterly inapplicable. The first concept excludes
no-one from freely disposing over the object, while the latter excludes everyone by declaring
the object inadmissible as an object of ownership. Ossorio finds res communis to be an
inadequate substitute for this notion of inadmissibility, and a look at what is and what is
not excluded by res communis clearly proves her right. Ownership, even in the case of res
communis, involves a right to transfer the power of disposition over a property. In the case of
res communis it merely excludes such transfers by single individuals—only the community
as a whole figures as the right holder with a corresponding entitlement to exercise such a
right. To view the human genome as res communis is to view the patenting of genes as a
transfer of the power of disposition from the community to a set of individuals who, in
their patent application, have demonstrated their ability to make use of the resource. On
this view, the question would no longer be whether genes are patentable in principle—that
they are would follow from their being commonly owned. Rather, the question would
become one of the democratic legitimacy of agreements delineating the conditions under
which gene patents are to be granted.
Ownership, however, involves more than the right to transfer; it also involves the right
to destroy the property. Yet surely this does not squarewell with the intuitions underpinning
the appeal to the CHI. These seem to run in the opposite direction, aiming to protect the
genome rather than to affirm humanity’s right to destroy it. This suggests that the notion
of res communis is ill-suited to accommodate the intuitions driving the appeal to the CHI.
Designating the genome as an inherited shared property shifts the debate towards gene
patents’ democratic legitimacy and threatens to run counter to the purpose of protecting it.
III
The CHI as presented so far regarded the genome as a natural resource subject to common
property rights. Abandoning the attempt to turn what many feel should be res nullius into
res communis, I now want to explore the idea that the human genome as a repository of
information can form part of our common heritage, but in the preservationist sense in which
talk of such a heritage was first codified in the UNESCO’s Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954, and later in The Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of 1972. This idea,
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which is more in the spirit of a res publicae than a res communis doctrine, has been advocated
by Ossorio on the grounds that it “avoids the problems of creating a property right in a
resource that resides within all individuals.”26 Defending this idea will involve getting clear
about what this other, preservationist heritage idea (PHI) is, and why the genome as a
repository of information should be subsumable under it.
What makes the cultural and natural heritage interesting for this debate is that it
constitutes an abstract entity composedofmany concrete but discontinuous parts belonging
to different people. This heritage conception gives shape to the idea that, questions of
ownership aside, one could be under an obligation to preserve a resource in virtue of that
resource’s contribution to an abstract whole in which mankind has an interest. In the
wake of World War II, the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property contended
that “damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage
to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the
culture of the world,”27 thus bringing into play the interests of “all mankind” in some
property independently of whose property it was. In the same spirit, the 1972 Convention
Concerning the Protection of theWorld Cultural and Natural Heritage argued that such
interests could be defended while largely side-stepping issues of ownership and autonomy:
Whilst fully respecting the sovereignty of the States onwhose territory the cultural and
natural heritage . . . is situated, and without prejudice to property rights provided by
national legislation, the States Parties to this Convention recognize that such heritage
constitutes a world heritage for whose protection it is the duty of the international
community as a whole to co-operate.28
The notion of cultural and natural heritage at play in the PHI is tied less to people’s rights to
partake in the benefits of a heritage than to their duties to protect and preserve that heritage.
The relationship articulated is not (primarily) one of ownership, but a fiduciary one.29
This shift of emphasis opens up the possibility of attributing heritage status to the genome
without thereby generating property rights, thus circumventing the problems which a CHI
modelled on the Convention on the Law of the Sea raised when applied to the human
genome.
Ossorio notes several fruitful parallels between cultural property and the human
genome. Both can be described as abstract ideas, composed of and embodied in discrete
objects; both can be regarded as being simultaneously subject to both private and public
26 Ossorio, p. 431.
27 UNESCO, “Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,” 215-240
at p. 215.
28 United Nations, “Convention Concerning the Protection of theWorld Cultural and Natural Heritage,”
U.S. Treaties and Other International Agreements (Paris, 1972), at Art. 6, §1.
29 Speaking in terms of a dichotomy between a fiduciary relationship and one of ownership is of course a
simplification: preservationist duties can be part of the bundle of property rights and liabilities, as is the
case with the ownership of a Picasso painting or of a house protected as historical monument.
DOUBLE NATURE OF DNA
interests: they may have a value for the individual who possesses them, and whose interests
can be protected (through private ownership, for example), but they also have value in virtue
of being part of a larger heritage, which may entail interests in its being both preserved and
publicly accessible. Ossorio also remarks that the consequences of designating the genome
as part of mankind’s heritage as drawn out according to the preservationist Conventions of
1954 and 1972 are well suited to promote the values underlying the move towards the CHI:
the PHI calls on the owners of cultural or natural heritage property to use and preserve
it “for the benefit of all humanity.”30 It emphasises the “duties of possessors to preserve
cultural treasures/natural wonders,” to “promote scientific investigation of” and “education
concerning”31 the heritage. Besides its focus on duties, the PHI also involves rights of access
in the form of assumptions that the “benefits of exposure to cultural and natural heritage”
will be “available to people without regard to nationality or generation.”32 In sum, this
version of the heritage doctrine promises to capture many of the concerns regarding the
human genome.
While Ossorio recognises that the PHI is fitting as far as its logical structure and
consequences are concerned, she has strong reservations about declaring the human genome
to be part of mankind’s heritage in the first place:
Does this urge to preserve reflect a certain inappropriate hubris regarding the centrality
of human beings in the grand scheme of things? . . . Does a desire to protect the human
genome indicate an over-inflated belief in the power of DNA to determine personal
identity? Before national governing bodies enact policies that venerate the human
genome, reasons for placing more significance on human genomes than on other
biological or physiological substances ought to be carefully delineated.33
Itmay be true that there is a danger of unjustified “veneration” of the human genome, driven
perhaps by anthropocentric ideas. But it does not follow that the sole alternative we have
in making sense of preservationist aspirations is to take them in the minimal, constitutive
sense that Ossorio suggests when she writes that “[t]o the extent that ‘the human genome’
is concretized in each human being as a particular genome, the human genome will exist so
long as human beings exist.”34 There are reasons to think that the human genome ought
to be preserved not just in this minimal sense, but in the rich, qualitative sense in which it
should be preserved in its diversity. These reasons revolve around the idea that the genome
forms a repository of information, both as a record of our biological history, and as a collection
of instructions for the development of phenotypic traits which may prove useful in the future.
30 Ossorio, p. 431.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 432.
34 Ibid.
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This line of thought is only as clear as the notion of information it appeals to, so this
notionmust be clarified in two respects: first, what dowemean by information?And second,
what is it information about? In answering the first question, biologists since J. B. S.Haldane
have found it useful to turn to the technical definition of “information” advanced byClaude
Shannon: information is what enables the narrowing down of prior uncertainty.35 It is
the quantity we obtain if we measure the difference between the ignorance or uncertainty
of a receiver before receiving a message and the receiver’s uncertainty after receiving the
message. This notion of information can be used to measure the genome’s information
capacity: genetic information is held in a sequence of nucleotides in much the same way
that computer information is held in a sequence of noughts and ones, only that instead of
using a binary code as computers do, DNA uses a quaternary code.36 However, while it is
one thing to calculate the information capacity of the human genome, it is quite another
to estimate its actual information content. In the course of evolution, gene duplications
and deletions have spawned a great diversity of genetic material. Much of human DNA is
currently thought to consist of “pseudogenes”37 that are recognisably related to protein-
coding genes, but are faulty in a way that results in their information not getting translated
into proteins. Moreover, since molecular evolution goes on even after the loss of function,
the degeneration and duplication of nonfunctional copies is likely to have littered the
genome with repetitive nonsense (though future research might well find functionality
even here). Consequently, the portion of the human genome that codes for proteins is
thought to amount to around 2 per cent.
With this understanding of genetic information, we can turn to our second question:
What is that information about? There are at least two senses inwhichDNAmolecules carry
information about something. The first is the sense in which all molecules necessarily carry
information, namely information about themselves: every molecule embodies information
about its ownmolecular structure, and DNA embodies information about nucleic acids
strung together in pairs on double-stranded sugar-phosphate backbones. This is the
information that DNA carries independently of what we have called its “double nature,”
and solely in virtue of being one phenotypic building block among others. But there is a
further sense in which DNA conveys information, and that is the sense in which it carries
instructions for how to build bodies. It is in this sense that genes are “Life’s instructions.”
35 Claude Shannon, “AMathematical Theory of Communication,” Bell System Technical Journal 27.3 (July
1948), 379-423.
36 The information content of each “letter” in a genetic sequence is two bits: before learning the letter’s
identity, there are four possibilities: A, C, T, and G; afterwards, there remains only one. In going from four
possibilities to one, we halve our uncertainty twice. If we apply this measure to the human genome, its total
information capacity will range in the gigabits (109 bits).
37 Greg Elgar and Tanya Vavouri, “Tuning in to the Signals: Noncoding Sequence Conservation in Vertebrate
Genomes,” Trends in genetics: TIG 24.7 (July 2008), 344-352 at p. 345.
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Talk of “instructions” highlights that genetic information is not information in the sense
of a “blue-print,” i.e. of a scaled-down version of something translated into a lower set of
dimensions, where there is a one-to-one correspondence between features of the blue-print
and features of what it is a blue-print of. Rather, it is information in the sense of a “recipe,”
where dierences in the instructions correspond to dierences in the product.38 This is
important because building from blue-prints is reversible, while building from recipes is
not (hence the practice of industrial espionage). By directing the synthesis of the structural
and catalysing materials of the body, genes act as recipes in just this sense. It is what sets
them apart from other molecules, and grounds talk of their double nature as both chemical
compounds and information carriers. Genes, we might say, are nature’s know-how.
This understanding of information sharply brings out what the information value of
DNA consists in: there are innumerable ways in which nucleic acids can be strung together
without fulfilling any function, let alone serving as templates for the synthesis of complex
and stable molecules. If the gene pool exhibits such a high concentration of functional
sequences, it is as a result of a process which, over the eons, has partitioned the immense
field of possible combinations into those that work, and those that do not. DNA possesses
not just information capacity, but actual information content as a result of having been
subjected to strong selective pressures paring away the non-functional. It is to isolate this
content that cDNA is synthesised: cDNA encapsulates the 2 per cent of signal in isolation
from the 98 per cent of noise while being both shorter than DNA and stabler than mRNA.
This information constitutes a type of know-how, instructions for how to build
phenotypes that successfully navigate specific environments, produce nutrients, resist
diseases and adapt to changing circumstances. This is the sense in which the genome is, in
Richard Dawkins’s words, a “genetic book of the dead”:39
As the generations go by, the whole set of genes of a species—the gene pool—is carved
and whittled, kneaded and shaped, so that it becomes good at making successful
individuals. . . . [I]n this sense . . . the species is learning from its experience in the art
of building good individual bodies, and it stores its experiences in coded form in the
set of genes in the gene pool. . . . The information that the experience packs away is
information about ancestral environments and how to survive them.40
This passage brings out one reason why the human genome should possess heritage value:
it can lay at least as much claim to being worthy of preservation as any other vestiges and
records of humanity’s past, such as ruins, artefacts and palimpsests. The genome forms
an immense repository of information, a record of our biological history which we are only
beginning to be able to read. Preserving the human genome in the rich sense which includes
38 The analogy with recipes or instructions is defended for instance inMarian Stamp Dawkins, “Let Them
Think Cake,”Nature 402 (1999), 234-235.
39 Richard Dawkins,Unweaving the Rainbow (Boston and New York: Mariner Books, 1998), p. 234.
40 Ibid., p. 239.
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the preservation of its diversity is key to preserving this informational heritage, much as
preserving a variety of documents in a library is key to preserving its value as a repository of
information. This does not give us license to say that the human genome is more valuable
than other genomes, period. But the focus on the human genome need express no more
than the fact that the human genome as a record of our history is more important to us, a
fact which is hardly surprising.41
A second reason for valuing the genome is that it is not just a record of our evolutionary
history and the challenges faced therein, but also an asset for future developments: it is a
collection of instructions for the development ofmany traits and talents, some ofwhichmay
not now be expressed, but many of which might provide valuable know-how for protein
synthesis, resistance to disease, and other forms of survival and flourishing (compare the
“antifreeze” gene found in Arctic fish which was spliced into tomatoes to save them from
frost damage). Viewing the genome as a repository of potentially useful information in
this sense gives us reasons to value genomes as resources for future scientific, medical, and
biotechnological development. Here, the privileging of human genetic material is a matter
of degree, and is analogous to the favouring of model organisms that are genetically similar
to us in biomedical research: the closer a genetic sequence housing some expressed or latent
talent matches our own, the more likely it is to be exploitable for us.
This view of the genome as a repository of talents also gives us reasons to value genetic
diversity.Writing about Sub-SaharanAfrica, where this diversity seems highest, E.O.Wilson
emphasises the potential inherent in diversity:42
It has not escaped the attention of human biologists and medical researchers that the
genes of modern-day Africans are a treasure house for all humanity. They possess our
species’ greatest reservoir of genetic diversity . . . an asset, prized for the adaptability it
provides all of us during an increasingly uncertain future. Humanity is strengthened
by a broad portfolio of genes that can generate new talents, additional resistance to
diseases, and perhaps even new ways of seeing reality.43
Wilson then goes on to call for “a new ethic of . . . hereditary variation,” one that “places
value on the whole of diversity.”44 Whether diversity is non-instrumentally valuable to us,
and whether such a value would apply to the human genome, are questions I want to leave
open here. Instrumentally, however, genetic diversity is straightforwardly valuable in that
41 This point is spelled out in Bernard Williams, “The Human Prejudice,” Philosophy as a Humanistic
Discipline, ed. AdrianW.Moore (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), 135-154 at p.
139.
42 That genetic diversity among humans is highest south of the Sahara became clear in 2010, when all of
the protein-coding sequences of the genome were published for four Khoisan hunter-gatherers and for a
Bantu from a neighbouring tribe. Outward similarity notwithstanding, the four Khoisan differed more
from one another than the average European differs from the average Asian. See Stephan C. Schuster et al,
“Complete Khoisan and Bantu Genomes from Southern Africa,”Nature 463.7283 (2010), 943-947.
43 Edward OwenWilson, The Social Conquest of Earth (London and New York: Liveright, 2012), pp. 80–81.
44 Ibid.
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it increases resilience towards epidemics: the more genetic types exist in a population, the
less likely it is that an epidemic will drive it to extinction. Moreover, high genetic diversity
makes it not only more likely that traits of interest and the genetic sequences associated
therewith will be found, but also that they will be generated: a diverse gene pool stands
a better chance of hitting upon a mutation of interest. But Wilson also points to ways in
which diversity might prove instrumentally valuable in less immediate ways: the gene pool
is a “treasure house,” a “portfolio” of the talents evolution as given rise to. In this sense,
it is nature’s oeuvre, comparable to the cultural heritage as the cumulative record of the
achievements of humanity. From this perspective, the thought that “the human genome
will exist so long as human beings exist” provides little solace to preservationists.
It might be objected that the genome’s protean nature renders the project of preserving
it absurd. What would it even mean to preserve something that undergoes continuous
alteration? The distinction between compounds and the information they carry can
once more help us focus the discussion: while there is no question that the set of all
genetic molecules in a species is subject to continuous modifications through replication,
disassembly and reassembly, there is considerable inertia at the informational level. 6.3
million years after the speciation event that separated us from chimpanzees, we still
share around 98.5 per cent of our genetic information with them; as for mice, the figure
is 85 per cent after 80 million years.45 These figures illustrate the general point that
evolutionary success depends as much on the ability to be conservative and preserve
successful configurations once they are discovered as on the ability to generate innovation
through random variation. What works endures and is, on human time-scales, quite stable.
To the extent that there is continual alteration at the informational level, one can retort that
it is a feature of our cultural or natural heritage as much as of the genome: all three, in their
own way, undergo continuous change.
But is every novelty equallyworthy of inclusion in the heritage? In the case of the cultural
and natural heritage, only a small fraction is found to be of interest at any particular time,
even though (and perhaps also because) new works of nature and culture are continuously
being generated. Uniqueness is not a sufficient condition for inclusion in the heritage.
Further conditions have to be met, such as the possession of historical value, aesthetic merit
or scientific interest. This leads us to the question of what these further conditions might
be in the case of the genome.
On the assumption that we have to selective, deciding by which criteria we should be so
raises thorny issues. Some, like Ossorio, take this path to be objectionable in principle. She
suggests that problems would arise
45 Nick Patterson et al, “Genetic evidence for complex speciation of humans and chimpanzees,”Nature 441
(June 2006), 1103-1108 at p. 1103.
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. . . with attempts to preserve only a portion of people’s genomes, either in vitro or in
vivo. This approach might result in attempts to assign the essence of humanity, or the
unifying properties of the human species, to a particular set of DNA sequences. Such
a policy likely would place too much importance and value on DNA. Furthermore,
finding the genetic essence of humanity is probably an impossible task, even if some
group of people could agree on what constitutes the essence of humanity.46
Leaving to one side the questionable assumption that, for reasons Ossorio does not divulge,
we should expect selective preservation to focus on a putative “essence of humanity,” this
passage is revealing in its assumption that it is preservation in vitro or in vivo that is at stake.47
If we distinguish between the chemical compound and the information it carries, we can
see that it is by no means necessary that genetic information should be preserved in either
of those ways. As Watson pointed out, DNA is useful in virtue of the information it carries,
while the information carrier is itself of little interest to us. We have already entered the
age in which we can go from digitised genome sequence information to a fully functional
genetic molecule, whichmeans that there is a third option: preservation in silico.48 Not only
is this the more practical option, but it is also the least problematical from an ethical point
of view. It avoids the problem of having to decide whose genotype to preserve by abstracting
away from the concrete analog molecule towards a digitally encoded representation of a
pool of information, and in view of the data-storage solutions available today, the pressure
to be selective in preservation in silico is very low. This is fortunate, because the PHI as
applied to the genome raises a problem of its own: while we can evaluate the historical
value, aesthetic merit or scientific interest of what is traditionally included in our cultural
and natural heritage, the genome presents us with the peculiar epistemic difficulty that
the significance of a particular sequence is probably not yet fully transparent to us. The
default attitude encouraged thereby is that as much genetic information as possible should
be preserved until we can adequately assess its value.
Any piece of genetic information derives its value primarily from being associated with
some phenotypic trait of interest to us. Traits of interest include immediately beneficial
traits, such as resistance to particular diseases, or the synthesis of therapeutic proteins, but
they might also be of interest by being potentially harmful, as the case of the increased risk
of cancer associated with BRCA1 and BRCA2 illustrates. What gives us reason to value a
46 Ossorio, p. 433.
47 If the notion of a genetic “essence of humanity” makes sense at all on this reading, it must be taken to refer
to the reference genome constructed through statistical means by the GRC. But even projects such as the
GRC’s measure their success by their ability to capture the breadth of genetic diversity within a species.
48 In 2009, the J. Craig Venter Institute developed a molecular engineering method to construct synthetic and
natural genes, genetic pathways and entire genomes. In 2010, they created a bacterial cell controlled by
an entirely chemically synthesized genome. See Daniel G. Gibson et al., “Enzymatic Assembly of DNA
Molecules up to Several Hundred Kilobases,”Nature Methods 6 (2009), 343-345; Daniel G. Gibson et al.,
“Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically Synthesized Genome,” Science 329.5987 (2010),
52-56.
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particular sequence of DNA is ultimately the role that this sequence does or could play in
our lives, where this role is to be understood in the widest sense as involving not only the
ways it is used as information within the practices of biomedical research and treatment,
but also the ways in which its phenotypic eects come to play a role in the lives of the agents
whose environment they shape. Thus, in pursuing the question of the value of genetic
information all the way to the value of individual traits, we transform it into the more
familiar, though no less difficult question of what traits we value in individuals, which leads
to the welcome conclusion that questions of “genethics” must ultimately be grounded in
the wider concerns of ethics and politics.
IV
Sixty years after its discovery, the human genome has become a focus of attention in
disciplines as various as forensics, jurisprudence, medicine, and political philosophy. Among
the leading ideas that have emerged in the course of these developments is the idea that
the human genome forms part of the common heritage of mankind. I have attempted
to give shape to and justify this idea by examining what sets DNA apart from other
molecules. The guiding insight thereby was that genetic molecules possess a peculiar double
nature: they are both relatively inert analog chemical compounds and carriers of digitally
encoded information of a particular kind. Corresponding to these two aspects of DNA,
we distinguished two ways in which concerns about the future of the human genome can
be made explicit under the title of the common heritage idea. On one view, the SPHI,
the human genome is a natural resource belonging to everybody, and we should vest in
mankind as a whole a property right to a discontinuous natural resource distributed over
all human cells. If modelled on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, this
view lays emphasis on the equitable sharing of all benefits derived from the human genome.
Because it would create property rights to something that is partly in our own and partly in
other people’s bodies, however, the SPHI conflicts with prevalent ideas about autonomy
and self-ownership. Moreover, it fails to capture the preservationist underpinnings of the
appeal to the common heritage idea.
The alternative view explored here, the PHI, articulates a fiduciary relationship between
mankind and a collection of information. This notion is modelled on preservationist
concerns about the future of the cultural andnatural heritage. It conceives of the genomenot
as res communis, but as res publicae; it substitutes rights of access for rights of ownership, and
lays emphasis on duties of preservation, promotion of scientific investigation, and education
concerning the heritage. What animates this view is the realisation that the genome forms
a valuable repository of information, both as a record of our biological history and as
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a collection of instructions for potentially useful phenotypic traits. Consequently, this
repository of information should be preserved in as much of its diversity as possible until
we are in a position to fully assess its value. But since it is to the information and not to its
physical substrate that the value attaches, this preservation may take place in silico, avoiding
many of the problems afflicting preservation in vivo or in vitro.
Having sketched how a conception of the CHI which seems to coherently capture
at least some of the concerns voiced in the gene patent debate could be spelled out and
justified, we can return to the question of its relation to the patent system. Following
Ossorio, I have argued that the implications of applying the PHI to human genome as
modelled on the UNESCO’s attitude towards the cultural and natural heritage would, in
the first instance, be limited to duties of preservation and, possibly, rights of access. This
has the advantage of allowing us to avoid the creation of property rights in the human
genome (either in the abstract or in its individual realisations), and, as Ossorio notes, “may
be the least difficult to implement and the most amenable to fulfilling the goals of common
heritage proponents.”49
The principle implication of an articulation of people’s intuitions about the genome in
terms of the PHI view is the dissolution of the perceived conflict with the patent system,
because these intuitions are directed away from issues of ownership and ownership-related
concepts and towards issues of preservation and access. Moreover, the patent system could
be seen as being supportive of the various preservationist concerns discussed above. On the
one hand, it provides strong incentives for research and the building of research databases
in this area. On the other hand, the patent databases themselves form an in silico record of
information, and one which is geared towards the dissemination of that information. By
encouraging both the protection and the disclosure of information, the patent system is
doubly subservient to preservationist ends.
Yet the disambiguation of DNA’s double nature brings out an element that is slightly
askew in reports of the Supreme Court’s decision. The message had widely been that the
building blocks of life hadbeen released from the grip of economic interests. But a closer look
at the decision reveals a different story. While the Court argued that DNA that has merely
been isolated (gDNA) is a product of nature and not patent-eligible, cDNA,which is created
from the DNA-derived template for protein synthesis, continues to be patent-eligible. In
view of DNA’s double nature, however, this seems to fail to resolve many of the issues at the
heart of the debate: while physically cDNA is clearly distinct from naturally occurringDNA
inmissing all non-coding segments, it is functionally identical withnaturally occurringDNA
where protein synthesis is concerned. gDNAmay have far greater information capacity than
cDNA, but its information content is, for current purposes, equivalent to that of gDNA.
49 Ossorio, p. 437.
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The judgement can thus be seen to hinge on the distinction between physical identity and
informational identity to prevent the patenting of entire gene sequences while continuing
to allow the patenting of the bits that are actually useful. The decision does not make it
sufficiently clear why claims to information encoded in the form of cDNA should be less
problematic than claims to information enshrined in gDNA.
By preserving the patentability of cDNA, the Supreme Court could be said to have paid
but lip service toWatson, since there is still an important sense in which “Life’s instructions”
are patentable. cDNA is even both medically and commercially the more important type of
molecule, as geneticist Eric Lander pointed out to the Court:
The vast majority of the medically and commercially important biotechnology
products developed over the past quarter century are protected by patents on isolated
DNA molecules that are non-natural compositions of matter, such as cDNA and
recombinant DNA molecules—for such uses as artificially producing therapeutic
proteins.50
As far as innovation is concerned, then, the Court’s decision leaves the chief incentives
untouched, and serves some of the patent system’s core objectives.
However, the Supreme Court’s decision does have consequences for what might we
might consider as falling under the rights of access to genetic information. Patents on cDNA
are easier to work around than patents on gDNA, which means that tests involving the
gDNA but not the cDNA version of a gene can now be offered without fear of patent
infringement.51 For this reason, the Supreme Court’s decision is likely to increase patient
access to diagnostic genetic testing and to reduce the tests’ prices as more firms start offering
them. Also, the Court’s decision does away with concerns about whole-genome sequencing
being impeded by gDNA patents, which will encourage firms to offer tests which rely on
such whole-sequencing methods.52 Other than that, the effect of the Court’s decision will
be limited by the fact that the race for whole-gene patenting is largely over, andmany gDNA
patents either have already expired or will expire soon.53 The DNA patents that will be of
practical concern in the future are likely to be patents on cDNA and synthetic DNA.
At the dawn of the age of genomics, gaining a nuanced understanding both of genetics
and of the ethical and political issues it raises is key to an early adoption of the right policies
in our dealings with the human genome. The pace of developments requires a constant
reevaluation of the dynamic relation between public opinion and the legal framework these
developments take place in. On the side of the legal framework, this means that while most
50 Eric S. Lander, “Brief amicus curiae ofUnited States in support of neither party,”Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013).
51 Arti K. Rai and Robert Cook-Deegan, “Moving Beyond ‘Isolated’ Gene Patents,” Science 341.6142 (2013),
137-138 at p. 137.
52 Ibid., p. 138.
53 Ibid.
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of the patents on whole human genes granted in the genomics gold rush of the nineties
are set to expire, new questions concerning bacterial DNA and synthetic DNA are moving
into view. On the side of public opinion, it means that the normative considerations in the
light of which legal practices are assessed cannot be presumed to be just a matter of people’s
established attitudes towards these questions. The complex, groundbreaking nature of
these issues implies that our uninformed opinion may well fail to coincide with the opinion
we would hold if we were better informed. Moreover, what opinion one holds or could
hold is itself a function of numerous factors, and importantly rests on a sense of what is
possible. In the public debate over these issues, it is therefore of paramount importance to
secure transparency and education concerning genomics, since it is precisely the boundaries
of the possible that are being pushed.
